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PERSONS AND THE POINT OF THE LAW
RICHARD W. GARNETT †
I.
I interviewed for a law-teaching position at Notre Dame Law
School in the Fall of 1997. So far as I know, that visit to Our
Lady’s university and to lovely, cosmopolitan South Bend, Indiana,
was my first. I had never attended a Catholic school at any level
and was not much of a Fighting Irish fan. The circumstances
and conversations that resulted in my being on campus for that
interview were both unpredicted and unpredictable, although I
know now they were providential.
In any event, what struck me most forcefully over that
weekend—besides the freezing rain that persisted throughout
the football game I attended1—was my now-colleagues’ palpable
enthusiasm for and excitement about what they were building.
That is, the “Catholic law school project”—at that time, at Notre
Dame—did not feel like and was not presented as an exercise in
nostalgia, retrieval, or reaction. Instead, there seemed to be a
widely shared sense that this “project” was something that had
not really been tried before and that the goal was not to regain
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1
Notwithstanding the bad weather, it was a great game. Notre Dame’s Allen
Rossum saved the 21–17 win by knocking Navy’s Pat McGrew, who had somehow
caught a long Hail Mary heave, out of bounds at the two-yard line as time expired.
See Al Lesar, Notre Dame 21, Navy 17, SOUTH BEND TRIB. (Nov. 1, 1997),
https://und.com/sports-m-footbl-archive-97season-nd-m-footbl-game09sum-html/
[https://perma.cc/KU7R-HNZP].
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something that had been lost but rather to work on something
new, namely, an engaged and excellent law school that was
meaningfully, distinctively, and therefore interestingly Catholic.2
I am grateful to Professors John Breen and Lee Strang for,
among other things, confirming that I and my colleagues were—
and, I hope, still are—right.
II.
Professors John Breen and Lee Strang have performed a
valuable service with their careful and engaging study of
Catholic legal education in the United States, A Light Unseen: A
History of Catholic Legal Education in the United States.3 Their
central and animating proposal is that “[a]ny plausible rationale
for a Catholic law school must justify the focal case of the school,
which is an academic institution and intellectual enterprise. . . .
[A] Catholic law school must also possess an ‘intellectual
architecture’ that sets it apart.”4 I enthusiastically embrace this
proposal and will consider some features of one such possible
“architecture” below. But first, I will briefly underscore three
points that are made or supported in A Light Unseen and that
seem essential to understanding, and carrying on, the “Catholic
law school project.”
First, and as was suggested above, this “project” today is not
an effort to return to an imagined Golden Age of Catholic legal
education during which the education and formation of lawyers
was pervasively informed and deliberately shaped by the Church’s
philosophical and intellectual resources and accomplishments. It
is a new, creative effort.5 As Breen and Strang show, “the

2
See Richard W. Garnett, Whom Should a Catholic University Honor?: “Speaking”
with Integrity, 49 J. CATH. LEGAL STUD. 233, 234 (2010) (“[T]he University of Notre
Dame is an important, interesting, and inspiring Catholic institution . . . .”).
3
John M. Breen & Lee J. Strang, A Light Unseen: A History of Catholic Legal
Education in the United States (Jan. 20, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on file
with the St. John’s Law Review).
4
Id. at 22; see also, e.g., id. at 465 (“[W]e conclude that a genuinely distinctive
Catholic identity must have an intellectual foundation. It must have an ‘intellectual
architecture’ that provides a rational structure and sense of direction to the
academic enterprise.”).
5
See generally, e.g., Thomas L. Shaffer, Why Does the Church Have Law
Schools?, 78 MARQ. L. REV. 401, 402–03 (1995) (exploring the mission of Catholic law
schools as “one way to be a priestly people”); Thomas M. Mengler, Why Should a
Catholic Law School be Catholic?, 7 J. CATH. SOC. THOUGHT 211 (2010) (discussing
two principal reasons why Catholic law schools should be Catholic: “Indispensable
Conviction” and Catholic moral formation as a “we”).
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principal reason why Catholic colleges and universities created
new law schools or acquired already existing ones was to provide
the children of Catholic immigrants with the means of socioeconomic advancement by becoming lawyers and gaining entry
into the professional classes of American society.”6 There were
other reasons, too, and they are presented and discussed in the
manuscript, but it seems clear that, with a few possible
exceptions, “Catholic law schools in the United States were not
founded with the goal of promoting a uniquely Catholic
philosophy of law . . . or specifically Christian approach to legal
education.”7 Instead, “the specific goal of articulating a Catholic
philosophy of law was clearly subordinate to other more
practical, demographic, and institutional goals . . . .”8
Second, and relatedly, Breen and Strang document
thoroughly their contention that, during the mid-to-late
twentieth century, for a variety of reasons, Catholic law schools
and their faculties came to a “new self-understanding of Catholic
identity” and, as part of this process, whatever distinctive
markers of Catholic character, mission, and ethos they might
have possessed were—with some exceptions—muted, watered
down, translated, or eliminated.9 As a result, today, “[o]ther than
the modifier ‘Catholic,’ [Catholic law] schools do not share
many—if any—distinguishing characteristics. There is next to
nothing about their faculty and faculty scholarship, their
curricula and pedagogy, student bodies, culture, and aesthetics
that set them apart from the mine-run of American law
schools.”10 And as Breen and Strang explain, most of the
practices, programs, slogans, and symbols that are sometimes
identified as evidence of continued, meaningfully Catholic
character do not, on examination, establish the case.11

6

Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 468.
Id. at 42.
8
Id. at 43.
9
Id. at 437 ff.
10
Id. at 464.
11
Id. at 462 ff.; see also, e.g., id. at 479 (“A purely ornamental, decorative
Catholicism is inadequate because it does not differentiate what occurs in the
classroom or in scholarship, and a rhetorical Catholic identity claiming a special
emphasis on social justice manifest, for instance, in legal clinics, is inaccurate.”).
7
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Third, A Light Unseen reminds any readers who needed
reminding that “personnel is mission” and mission is a decision.12
The failure of most law schools—particularly during their rapid
growth in the 1960s and 1970s—to hire faculty with “a strong
sense of mission” is identified, correctly, as contributing to the
fact that, “[a]t the close of this era, . . . Catholic law schools
[were] virtually indistinguishable from their secular
counterparts . . . .”13 It is true as a general matter, of course, that
the ability of a group, society, association, party, or institution to
stand for something, to express something, to advocate for
something, and to accomplish something depends crucially on the
ability to identify, form, and manage their leaders and staff.14
And this is true with a vengeance in the context of the project of
building, enhancing, and preserving a Catholic law school’s
distinctive character and mission. That is, any distinctiveness
with respect to character and mission depends on personnel—
administrators, staff, students, but especially faculty—who see
that distinctiveness as something to be pursued, valued, and
protected and not as an oddity to be hidden or an obstacle to be
overcome.
During my twenty years at Notre Dame Law School, this
necessity has been appreciated and embraced by the faculty
community, even as healthy differences and disagreements
regarding the entailments and implications of our distinctive
Catholic mission have been worked out and worked through. But
again: whatever the Catholic mission of a Catholic law school is,
it will not be realized without a clear-eyed, intentional, and
proactive focus on identifying, hiring, mentoring, forming, and
retaining committed faculty—of all faiths and none.
III.
Having highlighted these preliminary, but essential, points, I
want to focus on what was identified above as Breen and Strang’s
core claim: a Catholic law school must have an “intellectual
architecture” that sets it apart. Recall, again, that—whatever
else might have been, at various times, distinctive or unusual
12
Id. at 450; see also, e.g., id. at 21 (noting the “vital importance of intentionally
hiring faculty who know and embrace the school’s Catholic mission”).
13
Id. at 219.
14
Cf., e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 565
U.S. 171, 188–89 (2012); Cal. Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 572–73
(2000).
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about them—most Catholic law schools in the United States did
not and do not have such a setting-apart “intellectual
architecture.” If only because of the discrimination practiced by
other institutions, Catholic law schools had good numbers of
Catholic students and faculty, but their aims and practices, and
their understanding of the enterprise, were not innovative or
distinctive in ways that are connected to their Catholic character.
It is true that the schools aimed to facilitate access to the
profession for people who for socioeconomic and other reasons
were being kept out, and they later launched and developed
programs (as all law schools did) that provided experiential and
service opportunities to students and much-needed assistance to
vulnerable clients who might otherwise be unable to afford it. No
doubt, access and service to the marginalized and needy are good
things and would resonate with and appropriately reflect a
Catholic law school’s mission. Still, to paraphrase an observation
once made by a former colleague of mine, America’s Catholic law
schools were, and generally are, “public law schools in Catholic
neighborhoods.”15
Breen and Strang believe, though, that Catholic law schools
can, and should, be different in ways that go beyond
demographics and that they can, and should, possess and display
such an “architecture”: “For the adjective—Catholic—to be
meaningful, what it modifies—legal education—must be
different.”16 They are referring, again, to a distinctiveness that
involves more than providing clinics, teaching legal ethics, urging
students to direct their talents and training to the needs of the
vulnerable, and lifting up the importance of justice. They
contend, again, that if there is any value to distinctiveness, it
must be rooted in, and reflect, an “intellectual architecture.”
They consider, and reject, the possibility that either a naturallaw orientation or the body of post-nineteenth century “Catholic
Social Thought” could do the trick. Instead, and following
Alasdair MacIntyre,17 they propose—and I agree—that the
foundation and cornerstone of that architecture needs to be a

15

Alfred J. Freddoso, Introduction to CHARLES E. RICE, WHAT HAPPENED TO
NOTRE DAME?, at xii (2009).
16
Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 493.
17
See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, GOD, PHILOSOPHY, UNIVERSITIES: A
SELECTIVE HISTORY OF THE CATHOLIC PHILOSOPHICAL TRADITION (2011).
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distinctively Christian moral “anthropology,” that is, an account
of what it means to be human, why it matters that we are, and
what it means for our lives together.18
In the interest of full disclosure, it should be conceded that
the previous paragraph is an example of one author agreeing
with other authors because the latter’s views so neatly reflect the
former’s. A short, self-promotional anecdote will not, I hope, be
out of place: about seventeen years ago, I cofounded a “blog”
called “Mirror of Justice.” The blog proclaimed (and still
proclaims) the goal of developing “Catholic legal theory.” Its
contributors have included several dozen, mostly Catholic, law
professors from a range of institutions, some Catholic and others
not. In my very first post, “Law and ‘Moral Anthropology,’ ” I
wrote the following:
One of our shared goals for this blog is to . . . “discover[ ]
how our Catholic perspective can inform our understanding of
the law.” One line of inquiry that, in my view, is particularly
promising . . . involves working through the implications for
legal questions of a Catholic “moral anthropology.” By “moral
anthropology,” I mean an account of what it is about the human
person that does the work in moral arguments about what we
ought or ought not to do and about how we ought or ought not to
be treated; I mean, in Pope John Paul II’s words, the “moral
truth about the human person.”
The Psalmist asked, “Lord, what is man . . . that thou
makest account of him?” This is not only a prayer, but a
starting point for jurisprudential reflection. All moral problems
are anthropological problems, because moral arguments are
built, for the most part, on anthropological presuppositions.
That is . . . , our attempts at moral judgment tend to reflect our
“foundational assumptions about what it means to be human.”19

In any event, the point of this recollection is to agree with
Breen and Strang about the importance, and the centrality of,
the question: How might this idea of a distinctively Catholic

18

See, e.g., Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 464 (“We argue that the Catholic
intellectual tradition, focused on a Catholic anthropology of the human person, is the
likely best candidate to justify and order Catholic legal education.”).
19
Richard W. Garnett, Law and Moral Anthropology, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Feb.
6, 2004) (citations omitted) (quoting Psalms 143:3 (Douay-Rheims American)),
https://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2004/02/law_and_moral_a.html
[https://perma.cc/Q5WE-ENG9].
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moral anthropology ground and sustain the distinctive, and
distinctively Catholic, intellectual architecture of a present-day
law school?
To answer this question—or, at least, to gesture towards an
answer—I want to borrow from some thoughts that I have been
imposing on first-year law students for several years. I begin
these (what one student called) “dad talks” by suggesting that
the study of law involves at least four levels, or layers. (“Layers”
is better, I think, because it suggests that, as with a sphere, the
deeper one goes, from wherever on the surface one starts, the
closer one gets to the center.) I then take the students through a
tour of these layers:
[On] Layer One, [we encounter—again, and again, and
again—]the bare words of legal texts (statutes, constitutions,
judicial opinions, regulations, etc.). At this level, the new law
student encounters strange new terms like “replevin” and terms
of art like “mens rea” that can play shibboleth-type functions at
sports bars or provide proof-of-diligence to relatives at
Thanksgiving. Certainly, what happens on Layer One is
important. In law, [and not only to “textualists,”] words matter.
Part of learning to be a lawyer is learning how to use them
precisely, correctly, and [effectively].
Still, no legal education worthy of the name could stop
here. The study and practice of law involve more than just
performing utterances and producing words called “law.” The
terms that make up legal questions and problems do not,
generally speaking, assemble or select themselves. One has to
go deeper.
As they reach Layer Two, then, law students study and
learn about substantive legal doctrines (for example, the “Lemon
test” and the “mailbox rule”), interpretive techniques, and canons
of construction. They engage tests, standards, elements, and
forms. They develop legal skills in research, writing, advocacy,
counseling, and negotiation. They are pushed, in ways that can
be jarring and unsettling, to “think like a lawyer.” That is, they
become comfortable abstracting general principles from
particular cases, drawing distinctions, and identifying analogies.
They are challenged to read carefully, write clearly, and reason
[expertly].
[S]ome (shallow) understandings of “what it means to
study law and to be a lawyer” stop here, at Layer Two. Here,
some would say, we have the practical, the useful, the real. All
the rest—whatever might lie beyond (or beneath)—is just
theory, policy, and the ivory-tower navel-gazing of the
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frustrated or failed doctoral candidates who make up the law
professoriate. Sure, one might need to peek beyond Layer Two
for material to sprinkle over one’s exam answers, but one
shouldn’t expect to find anything of any use or relevance in the
trenches, in the “real world.”
This is entirely wrong[, however, and the] study and
practice of law involve more than terms and techniques. There
is no reason to think that our coming robot overlords will not be
able to function just fine at Layers One and Two. We must dig
deeper.
[And so], at Layer Three, we roll up our sleeves and test,
evaluate, and critique all the tools and terms we picked up at
Levels One and Two. This is where we can demonstrate, one
hopes, a comparative advantage over the robots. We ask, for
example, whether legal doctrines, rules, tests, standards, and
practices are consistent with the relevant history and whether
or not it matters that they are. We ask whether they operate
efficiently and produce desirable effects and incentives, and
whether they align with or contradict moral commitments.
It turns out, interestingly, that when we pursue our study
deeply enough to reach Layer Three, we start to see that many
of the law’s apparently discrete and distinct subject areas raise,
on examination, similar questions, and are “about,” in the end,
the same things. In fact, they may all be about the same thing,
singular: “How can we—how ought we—order our lives together
and best achieve our common good so that we can all flourish?”
I am confident that, at most law schools[—public and
private, religious and non-religious, Catholic and nonCatholic—]students are challenged to spend some time on Layer
Three[, just as they are challenged to participate in clinics, to
observe the rules of ethics, to promote access to justice, and so
on. At] most law schools, it is at least proposed to students that
they will not truly understand what’s going on at Layers One
and Two unless they have a sense of what’s going on at Layer
Three [and that what] happens below shapes what happens
above. Layers One and Two look like they do because of what is
going on at Layer Three. One can learn about legal doctrines,
but one will not really understand them unless one appreciates
the reasons why they are what they are.
[Layer Four, though, is—with] apologies to Douglas
Adams[—]the “meaning of life, the universe, and everything”
[l]ayer. Here, we ask not only about the “legislative intent”
underlying a particular provision, but also about, for example,
“who and what we are, what were we made for, and why it
might matter.” Layer Four is where we think about not only
the most efficient default rules and the “cheapest cost avoiders,”
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but also about the nature and destiny of the human person and
the connection between our human nature and the legal
enterprise. St. Augustine famously wrote that “you have made
us for yourself, O God, and our hearts are restless until they
rest in thee.” This is a fact about us. We need to ask, “What
differences does this fact make?” What does it mean for the law,
and for lawyering, that we have, as C.S. Lewis[—following
Pascal, following Augustine, etc.—]suggested, a God-shaped
hole [in us]?20

Back to Breen and Strang. As they observe, “law in the
Catholic . . . tradition has a point”; it is an activity or enterprise
with a purpose, that is, to advance the common good and thereby
promote the authentic flourishing of human persons.21 To
understand the “point” of the law, then, in order to understand
what human flourishing and human community are, one has to
wrestle with who and what persons are and are for, with moral
anthropology. The “intellectual architecture” that Breen and
Strang identify as being an essential dimension of any account of
a Catholic law school’s distinctiveness, then, must involve work
at Layer Four.
At least four aspects of or things about human persons
matter and are crucial to seeing and understanding the “point” of
law. And a meaningfully Catholic law school should be willing to
propose—indeed, should be enthusiastic about proposing—them
to its students: persons—that is, we—are dependent, relational,
rational, and loved.22 To say that we are dependent is to say that
we are not Promethean and fully autonomous. We exist in
community and need others for our flourishing and formation.
Similarly, we are relational. Social-contract theories that
imagine otherwise, and that try to build accounts of politics or
legitimacy on stories about self-sufficient individuals wandering
nervously through forests, fail to capture this truth of moral
anthropology. We are rational: we believe that we can get to the

20
These few paragraphs are adapted from Richard W. Garnett, Some
Thoughts for New Law Students, PUBLIC DISCOURSE (Aug. 26, 2019) (first quoting
DOUGLAS ADAMS, LIFE, THE UNIVERSE, AND EVERYTHING (1982); and then quoting
GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
(Yale Univ. Press 2008) (1970)), https://www.thepublicdiscourse.com/2019/08/54611/
[https://perma.cc/D8FK-AQ4T]. See C.S. LEWIS, THE PROBLEM OF PAIN 133–35
(HarperCollins 2014).
21
Breen & Strang, supra note 3, at 485.
22
See generally ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, DEPENDENT RATIONAL ANIMALS: WHY
HUMAN BEINGS NEED THE VIRTUES (Open Court Publ’g Co. 2011) (1999).
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truth. It is possible for the human mind to find and grasp the
right answer to the question posed.
Each of these aspects is, to understate things considerably,
worth discussing in far more detail than is possible here. For
present purposes, I want to dwell on “loved.” Like the Christian
philosopher, Nicholas Wolterstorff, I have to come to think that
what makes human dignity a fact, and what makes it the case
that we do have dignity, and rights, a fact that has important
implications for how we may and ought to treat each other, is
that we are loved by God. It is not our capacities and abilities
but our being-loved. Indeed, Christians believe that we are
loved—created and sustained, yes, but also loved—by a God who
is Love. That “God is love”23 is, Pope Emeritus Benedict proposed
in his first encyclical letter, the key to the “heart of the Christian
faith,” namely, “the Christian image of God and the resulting
image of mankind and its destiny.”24 In other words, “ ‘God is
love’ is not only the truth about God, it also carries and
illuminates the truth about us.”25 This truth provides a strong
account, not only of the what, but also of the why, of dignity, of
rights, and of justice—of the point of law.
Wolterstorff’s point echoes, I think, the beautiful children’s
story, The Velveteen Rabbit. In that story, a tattered, lost,
abandoned toy rabbit becomes, eventually, “real,” by virtue of
having been deeply and unconditionally loved by a little boy.
And as another of my Notre Dame colleagues, Paul Weithman,
has explained, for Wolterstorff, similarly, “[n]atural human
rights . . . inhere in the worth bestowed on human beings by that
love” and “are what respect for that worth requires.”26 The fact of
our being loved by a God who is Love is the key fact for any
Catholic legal theory or distinctively Catholic law school’s
mission, and understanding this fact is essential to seeing, and
then realizing, the “point” of the law.27

23

1 John 4:16 (New American).
BENEDICT XVI, ENCYCLICAL LETTER DEUS CARITAS EST ¶ 1 (2005).
25
Richard W. Garnett, Church, State, and the Practice of Love, 52 VILL. L. REV.
281, 281 (2007).
26
Richard W. Garnett, Righting Wrongs and Wronging Rights, FIRST THINGS
(Oct. 2008) (quoting Paul Weithman), https://www.firstthings.com/article/2008/10/
003-righting-wrongs-and-wronging-rights [https://perma.cc/GC2B-PLVJ ].
27
For an intriguing example of asking what a particular legal practice, criminal
punishment, would look like if we regarded love (agape) as the first virtue of social and
legal institutions, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Law Like Love, 55 SYRACUSE L. REV. 15, 18
(2004).
24

